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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Due Process - Denial of Inspection of Personal Institutional File Does Not Violate a Parole
Applicant's Right of Due Process in the Second Circuit.
Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434
U.S. 944 (1978).
Plaintiff Michael Williams, a state prisoner, brought suit' against
the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services and the Chairman of the New York State Board of
Parole claiming a denial of due process protection under the fourteenth amendment 2 for parole3 applicants in not having access to
information contained in his parole file.' The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the plaintiff and denied the defendant's subsequent motion to vacate judgment.' Judge Whitman Knapp entered final
judgment' requiring the defendants to provide the plaintiff with
copies of all unconfidential material contained in his parole file, a
fair summary of confidential material therein, and a new parole
release hearing.7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and dismissed.' Judge Friendly acknowledged that the interest of a parole applicant in a parole release decision was subject to
some due process protections,' but held that disclosure of the parole
1. Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1978).
2. The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
3. In criminal law, parole is a conditional release from confinement subject to certain
conditions to be observed by the convict. The parolee remains in constructive custody subject
to being retaken and returned to actual custody. BLACK's LAW DiCTIONARY 1273 (4th ed. 1951).
See also People ex rel. Natoli v. Lewis, 287 N.Y. 478, 41 N.E. 2d 62 (1942).
4. 556 F.2d at 1146. Williams had reason to believe that his file contained copies of at
least two letters which stated that he was mentally disturbed. Williams felt that the allegedly
false information might prejudice the Board's decision. He therefore petitioned the Chairman
and the Commissioner for the removal of the letters. Receiving no response, Williams filed
suit in August 1975. In September 1975, the Board denied parole. In its required written
statement, the Board cited the violent and vicious nature of Williams' crimes as well as his
lack of participation in any of the offered rehabilitative programs available. The statement
contained no reference to any mental disturbance. Id. at 1145-1146.
5. The orders were filed on June 11 and July 23, 1976. Id. at 1148.
6. Williams v. Ward, 416 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
7. Id. at 1125.
8. 556 F.2d at 1162.
9. Id. at 1158.
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file was not constitutionally required.' 0 Thus, although a parole applicant's right to procedural due process has undergone considerable
interpretation and expansion in the Second Circuit within the last
eight years, at present, a parole applicant has no protected- right of
access to his parole file."
In Menechino v. Oswald,21 decided on August 5, 1970, the Second
Circuit held that a parole applicant, constitutionally deprived of his
right to liberty for the duration of his sentence, was "[l]ike an alien
seeking entry into the United States . . .he does not qualify for

procedural due process in seeking parole."' 3 The court went on to
note that all seven circuit courts of appeal which had passed upon
the issue had held an inmate is not entitled to due process as a
matter of constitutional right."
In 1971, considering the rights of a parolee whose parole had been
revoked in United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Board of
Parole," the Second Circuit reiterated and strengthened its position
regarding the rights of parole applicants by contrasting their position with that of the parolee:"
Unlike a prisoner being considered for parole release, a parolee facing reim-,prisonment stands to lose a 'presently enjoyed' interest in his conditional
freedom . . . .It is not sophistic to attach greater importance to a person's
jUstifiable reliance in maintaining his conditional freedom . . . than to his

mere anticipation or hope of freedom.,

In 1972, the United States Supreme Court relied on the Bey distinction in its landmark case of Morrissey v. Brewer. 7 The plaintiffs, both parolees from the Iowa State Penitentiary, claimed deprivation of due process when their paroles were revoked without hear10. Id. at 1145.
11. Id.
12. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971). Petitioner, a state
prisoner, sought declaratory judgment of his right to procedural due process at a parole
release hearing.
13. Id. at 408-09.
14. Id. at 409, citing Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Thompson v. United States Bd.of Parole, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir.
1968); Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961);
Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964); Hodge v. Markley, 339 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965); Mead v. California Adult Auth., 415 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1969).
15. 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971).
16. 443 F.2d at 1086.
17. 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
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ings. 1 In its review, the Court specifically noted the parolees' circumstance of "conditional liberty" as opposed to the inmates' imprisonment. The Court stated that "[tihough the State properly
subjects [a parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other
citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in

a prison."'" The termination of this "conditional liberty", while not
the termination of the unqualified liberty of a free citizen by process
of criminal prosecution and thus requiring the full panoply of fourteenth amendment rights, nevertheless requires some orderly pro-

cess." The Court set forth the following requirements of minimum
due process:"
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and detached"
hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not
be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders
as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.

Stating that the process should remain flexible,22 the Court went on
to emphasize that there was no intent to equate a parole revocation

procedure with a criminal prosecution 3 and declined to decide the
question of the parolee's right to counsel.
In 1973, the Supreme Court extended the limited due process

rights of Morrissey to the area of revocation of probation in Gagnon
v. Scarpelli4 wherein the probation of the respondent had been

revoked without hearing.2" The Court determined that the revocation of probation, like the revocation of parole resulted in a loss of
18.

Id. at 472-73.

19. Id. at 482.
20.

Id.

21.

Id. at 489.

22.
23.

Id.
Id.

24. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Probation revocation is the official transaction by which the
conditional freedom of a sentenced individual is withdrawn.
25. Id. at 780. "Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and parole,
the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed
previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole. See, e.g., Van
Dyke, ParoleRevocation Hearingsin California:The Right to Counsel, 59 CAUF. L. Ray. 1215,
1241-1243 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practicein Probationand Parole Revocation Hearings, 55
J. CRIM, L.C. & P.S. 175, 198 n. 182 (1964)." Id. at 782 n.3.
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liberty, but again cautioned that such revocation procedures were
not to be equated with a stage of criminal prosecution.2 In this vein,
the Scarpelli Court declined to state a hard rule with regard to the
right to counsel. 7 The Court preferred a case-by-case approach,n
and specifically sought to avoid the creation of an adversarial atmosphere in a non-adversarial proceeding.29
In 1974, the Supreme Court, in Wolff v.McDonnell,3" extended
due process protection to prisoners facing loss of "good-time credits." 3' The complaint of inmate respondent McDonnell alleged that
prison disciplinary proceedings wherein such sanctions could be
imposed violated due process.32 Distinguishing the deprivation of
"good-time" by stating that it is "qualitatively and quantitatively
different from the revocation of parole or probation ' 33 in that it does
not work any immediate change in the prisoner's condition of liberty, 3 the Court nevertheless concluded that some, but not all, of
the procedures outlined in Morrissey and Scarpelli must accompany
state deprivation proceedings. 5
Again, the Court was reluctant to allow the presence of counsel
in proceedings, reasoning that this would "inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a
means to further correctional goals." 3 All three Supreme Court
cases 37 sought to define the prisoner's interest in liberty,"8 to determine whether the loss of this liberty would constitute a "grievous
loss",

39

and to strike a balance between the interests of the prisoners

26. Id. at 782.
27. Id. at 790.
28. Id. at 789.
29. Id. at 787-88.
30. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107 (Cum.Supp. 1972). This statute provides in part that the
chief executive officer of a prison facility may reduce a prisoner's sentence for parole purposes
by giving time credits for good behavior, faithful performance of duties and for particularly
meritorious behavior. Id. at § 83-1,107(1).
32. 418 U.S. at 543.
33. Id. at 561.
34, Id.
35. Id. at 571.
36. Id. at 570.
37. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
38. 408 U.S. at 480-81; 411 U.S. at 781-82; 418 U.S. at 556-57.
39. 408 U.S. at 482; 411 U.S. at 781; 418 U.S. at 561.
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and the functional requirements of the institutions." The parolee,
probationer, or inmate's concern with a possibly unjust deprivation
of liberty must be weighed against the interests of the institution
in maintaining the discipline necessary to effect a successful rehabilitation program, and in avoiding actions prejudicial to the safety
of the community at large. In each decision, the Court stressed that
the application of due process protection should remain flexible
according to the circumstances."
Following the line of expansion of due process established by
Morrissey, Scarpelli, and Wolff, the Second Circuit in 1974 went one
step further. The Court in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chair2 wherein an inmate who had
man, New York State Board of Parole"
been denied parole sought a statement of reasons for denial, 3 held
that a parole applicant is subject to some due process protection."
Specifically, the applicant has the right to a statement of reasons
for the Board's denial of parole." The Second Circuit explained this
surprising modification of its previous denial stance taken in
Menechino,'1 by stating that in the Menechino case, unless the full
panoply of procedural due process rights sought by Menechino was
granted, the applicant was not interested in merely obtaining a
statement of the Board's reasons "for denial". The Court therefore
gave no consideration to partial relief.'7
In light of Morrissey'sgrant of due process to parolees, the Second
Circuit now reasoned that since parole was henceforth to be regarded as a "conditional liberty", representing a protected
"interest", a parole applicant's interest in prospective parole must
be viewed in a similar manner. "To hold otherwise would be to
40. 408 U.S. at 484; 411 U.S. at 785-86; 418 U.S. at 572.
41. "We have no thought to create an inflexible structure for parole revocation procedures." 408 U.S. at 490. "But due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant
interests in informality, flexibility, and economy must always be sacrificed." 411 U.S. at 788.
"As the nature of the prison disciplinary process changes in future years, circumstances may
then exist which will require further consideration and reflection of this Court." 418 U.S. at
572.
42. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub nom., Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015

(1974).
43.
44.

500 F.2d at 926.
Id.

45. Id.
46.

430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).

47.

500 F.2d at 927.
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create a distinction too gossamer-thin to stand close analysis.
Whether the immediate issue be release or revocation, the stakes are
the same: conditional freedom versus incarceration."" Using the
criteria established in Morrissey and the succeeding cases of
Scarpelli and Wolff, 4" the Second Circuit reviewed the nature of the
applicant's interest,50 his risk of loss," and the need for balance
between the applicant's interest and the penal system's demands"
and, once again, took the opportunity to emphasize the nonadversarial nature of a parole release." The Johnson Court concluded that the minimum due process procedures required in the
present instance would be satisfied by supplying the parole applicant with a statement of reasons, sufficient to enable a reviewing
body to determine whether the actions of the Board were arbitrary
or not.5
In 1975, Haymes v. Regan 5 held that while the New York State
Parole Board need not disclose its release criteria, it must follow
Johnson in providing the applicant with a specific statement of
reasons and facts for denial of parole." The Second Circuit noted
that the New York Correction Law had been recently amended to
codify Johnson.57 Consistent with the prior cases," Haymes reached
its decision after considering the balance of the applicant's interest
and the need for due process protection in the immediate circumstances." The Court recognized that a Parole Board has great discretionary power in determining whether and when parole release is
required" and that an inmate has a vital interest in the Board's
48. Id. at 928.
49. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
50. 500 F.2d at 928.
51. Id. at 929.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 928.
54. Id. at 934.
55. 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). Petitioner Haymes sought declaratory relief on the
grounds that the, procedures of the Parole Board were inadequate and violative of his procedural rights.
56. Id. at 542-43.
57. Id. at 543. "If, after appearance before the board pursuant to subdivision four of this
section, the prisoner is denied release on parole, the board shall inform such prisoner, in
writing and within two weeks of such appearance, of the facts and reason or reasons for such
denial." N.Y. CORRECTION LAw § 214 (McKinney 1975).
58. See notes 38-40 supra.

59.
60.

525 F.2d at 543.
Id.
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decision and should have some procedural protection." The Court
answered that the required statement of facts and reasons for denial
of parole "should serve to protect the inmate, from arbitrary and
capricious decisions
or actions grounded upon impermissible con'
siderations. " 2
The next case, Billiteriv. United States Board of Parole,3 decided
in 1976, sharply defined and limited the Circuit's previous two holdings. In Biliteri,a parole applicant sought pre-hearing access to his
presentence report, examiner panel's report and other information
contained in the Parole Board File.' The Court found no denial of
due process in that the parole applicant was demanding a right to
a type of discovery procedure in advance of his parole hearing."5
Citing Haymes," the Second Circuit held that "even after parole
is denied such discovery is not 'required as part of the minimum
due process to be accorded a parole applicant.' "'I Although Johnson
and Haymes entitle the applicant to a written statement of
grounds for denial, Hayrnes denies the right of revelation of specific Board criteria and Billiteri flatly states that the applicant has
"no such constitutional right to the information in the Parole
Board's file . .

,,"8

In 1976, the Second Circuit again reviewed the issue in Holup v.
Gates." State prisoners sought access to their parole files before
parole hearings, alleging that denial of this access was a violation
of due process. 0 The Second Circuit reiterated the considerations of
Johnson7 and Haymes2 regarding the applicant's interest and the
need for balancing and concluded that it could accept these previous holdings as dispositive.1 These cases required the Parole
61. Id.
62.

Id. at 544.

63. 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976).
64.
65.

Id. at 945.
Id.

66. 525 F.2d at 542.
67. 541 F.2d at 945 (emphasis added) (citing Haymes v. Regan, 525 F.2d 540, 542 (2d Cir.
1975)).

68. Id.
69.

544 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 941 (1977).

70. Id. at 84.
71.
72.
73.

500 F.2d at 543.
525 F.2d at 928-29.
544 F.2d at 85-86.
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Board to supply the applicant with a written statement of grounds
and reasons for denial, nothing more. The defendant had done this.7"
The court did, however, take the opportunity to speculate that if the
court were made aware of frequent errors in the state parole files,
the court might reach another conclusion." "The question is
whether due process requires us to assume that only by exposing
every prison file in advance can misinformation or failure to consider information favorable to the prisoner in the parole release
process be substantially avoided."" Yet even so, the court reflected
on the possible immateriality of such mistakes" and the possible
onerous burden on the Board of redacting every such file.7" The
Second Circuit did not resolve these speculations and remanded the
79
case.
At present, the Supreme Court has yet to determine the extent
to which a parole applicant is entitled to due process. In 1976, in
Scott v. Kentucky ParoleBoard,80 the Court postponed any decision
on the matter by remanding the case to the court of appeals on the
question of mootness.11 There was a strong dissent by Mr. Justice
Stevens, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Powell
joined,"2 stating that the constitutional issue involved was an extremely important question and should be decided." "Delay in deciding the merits will affect not only these litigants, but also other
pending litigation and parole procedures in every jurisdiction in the
country.""4
The present case of Williams v. Ward" brings the question clearly
into focus: Whether procedural protections of due process entitle
Michael Williams, a parole applicant, access to his parole file.
Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, held that they do
74. Id. at 86.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 87.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 429 U.S. 60 (1976).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 61.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 64.
85. 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1978).
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not.8" In reaching this conclusion, Judge Friendly reviewed the prior
existing case law of both the Supreme Court" and the Second Circuit. 8 He began with Morrissey"'and noted that a parolee's interest

in parole revocation is protected by some due process requirements, 0 that Scarpellil' extended this protection to probationers,"2
and that Wolff 3 further extended due process to reach a prisoner's
loss of "good-time" credits." Judge Friendly found that this trend
was not halted by the recent decisions of Meachum v. Fanol5 and
Montanye v. Haymes," wherein the Court held that a state prisoner
had no due process right to a hearing when transferred from one
state facility to another. 7 Nor has the Court's dictum in Moody v.
8 that a prisoner's eligibility
DaggettH
for rehabilitation programs in
a federal prison required no due process procedures"8 undercut the
present position of the parole applicant in the Second Circuit.)00
In reviewing the Second Circuit cases, Judge Friendly stated that
it is settled law for an inmate, as a parole applicant, to be subject
to some due process protections. 10 However, the Judge relied upon
Johnson,02 Haymes, "Ian Billiteri'' to limit Williams' due process
rights to a "Haymes statement" of reasons and facts.0 5 Applying the
three-prong test of Johnson'8 and the balancing test of Haymes,07
both adapted by the Second Circuit from the Supreme Court tril86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1155-58.
Id. at 1158-60.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
556 F.2d at 1155.
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
556 F.2d at 1156.
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
556 F.2d at 1156.
427 U.S. 215 (1976).
427 U.S. 236 (1976).
556 F.2d at 1157.
429 U.S. 78 (1976).
Id. at 88 n. 9.
556 F.2d at 1158.
Id.
500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.
525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir.
556 F.2d at 1160. See
500 F.2d at 928-29.
525 F.2d at 543.

1974).
1975).
1976).
note 57 supra.
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ogy,0 5 Judge Friendly held that, while Williams did have a protectable interest,' 0 the applicant did not suffer a grievous loss through
denial of access to his files."10 Any further relief must be balanced
against a direct burden on the Board."' Williams' relief was thereby
limited to the "Haymes" statement.
In dismissing the defendant's and district court's reliance upon
Velger v. Cawley,"2 Judge Friendly relied on the Supreme Court's
and Second Circuit's long standing reluctance to treat a parole hearing as an adversarial procedure."' Velger concerned the petition of
a former probationary policeman for reinstatement and damages
after his dismissal from the police force without a hearing. The
petitioner's hearing would have been admittedly adversarial."'
Judge Friendly thus found a fundmental 'difference in circumstance."5 The court also dismissed the defendant's other supporting
case of Cardaropoliv. Norton."' While the designation of an inmate
as a "Special Offender""' 7 is subject to certain due process procedure,"5 Williams was not officially classified as such and there was
no dispositive proof that the Board had relied on any unofficial
classification.1"9
Judge Hays dissented. 2 The judge did not advocate a per se
extension of discovery rights to all parole applicants, but would
hold, on the present record, due process to mandate that Williams
be given access to his parole files and granted a new release hearing.' 21 Although concurring with the court's finding that parole ap108.

See text accompanying note 37 supra.

109.
110.

556 F.2d at 1158.
Id. at 1160.

111.
112.

Id. at 1159-60.
525 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub horn. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S.

624 (1977).
113. See text accompanying notes 36 & 53 supra.
114. 525 F.2d at 337.
115. 556 F.2d at 1162.
116. 523 F7.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1975). Petitioner, a federal prisoner, sought relief in that his
classification as a "Special Offender" was a deprivation of liberty without due process protections. Id. at 992-93.
117. The term "Special Offender" is currently used by the Bureau of Prisons and designates "certain special categories of offenders who require greater case management supervision than the usual case." Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 7900.47 (April 30, 1974).
118. 556 F.2d at 1162.
119. Id. at 1161. See note 4 supra.
120. Id. at 1162 (Hays, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 1166 (Hays, J., dissenting).
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plicants enjoy some due process rights,'2 Judge Hays disagreed with
the court's finding that Williams suffered no loss.'23 He returned to
2 ' and
Cardaropoli'
reasoned that the due process applicable to a
"Special Offender" as one who has suffered the" required "grievous
loss"' 5 should indeed be applied to Williams.' The judge argued
that Williams had been specially classified on the basis of allegedly
false information. The very language of the court states that "there
may in the future be circumstances where an inmate plausibly contends' that the only way he can demonstrate reliance on an impermissible factor or can show'a particular allegation concerning his
record to be false is by obtaining access to the detailed evidence in
his file, albeit in redacted form."'' 7 Judge Hays felt that "the future" was, in this instance, now the present.
Moreover, Judge Hays demonstrated the consistent qualification
of the Supreme Court and Second Circuit that the limits and requirements of due process must vary according to the particular
circumstances.' 2 8 He vigorously argued that the present case requires a flexible approach.'2M Agreeing that Williams had a protected
interest but arguing that there was indeed a subsequent "grievous
loss", Judge Hays went on to reject the third "balancing" consideration of the court's decision. Judge Hays observed that the court
"raise[d] the specter of the impossible administrative burden . . .
occasioned by granting parole applicants broad rights to inspect
their files. .... ,,10 The judge found this unfair 3 ' in that the State
failed to raise this argument in the district proceedings or in the
present case, 3 2 and suggested that the matter be remanded to the
33
district court for a determination of what the burden would be.'
122. Id. at 1163 (Hays, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Hays, J., dissenting).
124. 523 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1975).
125. 556 F.2d at 1164 (Hays, J., dissenting) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)).
126. Id. (Hays, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1160 (Hays, J., dissenting) (comparing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229
n.8 (1976)).
128. Id. at 1165 (Hays, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 41 & 75 supra.

129. Id. at 1165-66 (Hays, J., dissenting).
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1166 (Hays; J., dissenting).
(Hays, J., dissenting).
(Hays, J., dissenting).
(Hays, J., dissenting).
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In conclusion, the expansion of due process rights in state correctional proceedings has stopped short of the "full panoply" of fourteenth amendment guarantees and denies a right of discovery altogether. While parolees, probationers, inmates, and now parole applicants have been granted limited due process, the courts have
been consistently way of approaching the "full trappings of adversarial trial-type hearings.""' This is evident in the courts' continued
refusal to permit counsel at revocation and parole proceedings! " or
to permit trial-type tactics such as discovery.' 31 Indeed, even Judge
Hays, dissenting in Williams,"7 based his dissent only upon the
record before him and did not advocate a general extension of
rights.13
Rabun Huff Bistline
134. Id. at 1159, quoting Johnson, 500 F.2d at 934, quoting Beckworth v. New Jersey State
Bd. of Parole, 62 N.J. 348, 301 A.2d 727, 733 (1973).
135. See text accompanying notes 36 & 53 supra.
136. See Billiteri, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1977).
137. 556 F.2d at 1162 (Hays, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Hays, J., dissenting).

